



Is following Jesus natural? Many would say no, but this book argues yes. Saying no suggests that grace and human nature are alternate moral categories. Saying yes implies that our humanity is gracious in origin, capacity, and intent. Much of this discussion hangs on what is meant by “nature” and “natural,” and this book explores these ideas creationly and christologically. Part One considers natural law as commonly found in the classical Christian tradition. Part Two explores the radical christological tradition of Anabaptism. Part Three then proposes the two-nature christology of the Chalcedonian definition as a theological resource enabling their reconciliation. The Chalcedonianism of the modern Barth and the ancient Maximus the Confessor are appropriated, along with scientific theology of T. F. Torrance and Nancey Murphy. If Chalcedon correctly affirms Jesus’ humanity as being *homoousios* (one nature) with our humanity, created like Adam’s through the eternal Spirit, then Jesus’ life was natural—proper to its created intent. And as his divine nature was *homoousios* with the Father’s nature, he is the human expression of the divine Word which gives creation its contingent moral rationality. As such, the life of Jesus (Anabaptists’ concern) is morally normative for all humanity (natural law’s concern).

The Word Became Flesh

A Rapprochement of Christian Natural Law and Radical Christological Ethics

David Griffin

Foreword by Gordon Preece

“Griffin’s ambitious book re-joins the oft-separated classical theological tradition of the Logos and the radical Christocentric Anabaptist tradition. His theological peacemaking and robust argument provide a rich synthesis of apparent opposites. Shed your skepticism to see what coherence Griffin uncovers through this rapprochement and what radical theological and ethical fruitfulness potentially follows.”

—GORDON PREECE, Director of Ethos: Evangelical Alliance Centre for Christianity and Society, Melbourne, Australia

“Orthodox *and* radical? Natural and in sync with (the radical ethics of) the Word made flesh? Yes, says David Griffin in this well-written and challenging book. Just at the moment when there seems to be an uptake in interest in natural law and questions raised about whether orthodoxy can fit with radical, Christ-centered ethics, this book sheds much-needed light on the subject. What a timely intervention, opening up fresh angles on age-old subjects.”


—MARK THIESSEN NATION, Co-author, *Bonhoeffer the Assassin?*, 2013

“Finally, someone has dared to do the seemingly unthinkable! Griffin’s ambitious argument will not be the last word about the relationship between Christocentric radicalism and natural law, but it serves excellently as a fruitful (and just slightly polemical) provocation.”

—PAUL MARTENS, Associate Professor of Religion, Baylor University

“This complex book explores a complex topic: the relation of natural law and radical christological ethics to Christology proper. This is an important question about which Griffin makes important claims. By reconciling them by way of Chalcedonian Christology, he enables natural law ethics to be more robustly *Christian*, and radical christological ethics to be more open to the world. Griffin’s wide-ranging discussion rewards careful reading with challenging and stimulating insights, making the effort well worthwhile.”

—ANDREW SLOANE, Morling College



DAVID GRIFFIN is the pastor of North Canberra Baptist Church and a chaplain at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. He is a current member of the Anabaptist Association of Australia and New Zealand (AAANZ).

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The Word Became Flesh

A Rapprochement of Christian Natural Law
and Radical Christological Ethics

DAVID GRIFFIN

Foreword by Gordon Preece

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THE WORD BECAME FLESH

A Rapprochement of Christian Natural Law and Radical Christological Ethics

Australian College of Theology Monograph Series

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To Jenny and Jonathan, whose lives of Christ-like kindness
are worthy of my imitation.

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Foreword

In a recent meeting with David Griffin in Australia's capital Canberra, he was reminiscing about his youth in the Sydney seaside suburb of Cronulla. It was there we first met, and fellowshiped and ministered together. And it was there that he spent whatever time he could surfing, he still does. Truth be known, half of his school was at the beach in school hours. David was a much better board-rider than I, but behind that passion, lay a larger passion for God as Creator, the one who can stir up a mighty swell, and the aesthetic but dangerous arc of a beautiful break. It seemed to me that surfing for David, like Norman Maclean's 1976 book, now Robert Redford film, *A River Runs Through It*, through fly-fishing, encountered a form of liquid Logos. And the face of that creative God is expressed utterly and finally in flesh, in Jesus Christ.

I mention this biographical detail because the reader of this thesis turned to book, *The Word Became Flesh*, will find not only a powerfully coherent argument marshalling major streams of the Great Tradition, East and West, Reformed, Lutheran, Catholic, Orthodox and Anabaptist, but a book that profoundly links the Logos and created life. For the streams that David draws together, in ways perhaps unlikely to some, have been separated to the detriment of each, in a series of theological schisms. They have sometimes torn the Alpha and Omega of Christ, the Creator and new Creator, apart, so that the purpose and point of the whole alphabet of life is somehow left out.

I mentioned our national capital Canberra, where David pastors at North Canberra Baptist Church, because I believe that while much of this book is high-level dogmatic theology, it also has a powerful impetus towards an incarnational ethics and public theology. David is a fine example of what Kevin Vanhoozer and Owen Strachen have called *The Pastor as Public Theologian* (Baker 2015). For several decades David has kept alive and sharpened his linguistic and exegetical skills, his wide and deep theological

x FOREWORD

and ethical reading in a seasoned way that will be of great benefit, not only to academic theologians, but theologically literate pastors and laity.

David is nothing if not ambitious in this book. He surfs the great wave of the Great Tradition, but in a way that joins the two waves of the Classical tradition of the Logos with the radical Christocentric Anabaptist tradition. His is a story of theological peace-making between sometimes seeming enemies. He does this through sympathetic listening to the historical nuances of both traditions but with robust argument in a richly synthetic re-reading of what many claim to be opposed. Put aside your scepticism for a while to see what coherence he uncovers through this rapprochement and what radical theological and ethical fruitfulness potentially follows. I commend *The Word Became Flesh* to your diligent reading. It will take time to digest, but will provide rich sustenance, even if you find you cannot swallow it whole.

Rev'd Dr Gordon Preece,
Director of Ethos: Evangelical Alliance Centre for Christianity and Society,
Melbourne, Australia.

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My wife Jennifer, for her unstinting support.

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Abbreviations

<i>ANF</i>	Ante Nicene Fathers
<i>CD</i>	Church Dogmatics
<i>CHSS</i>	C. Henry Smith Series
<i>CNTC</i>	Calvin's New Testament Commentaries
<i>CRR</i>	Classics of the Radical Reformation
<i>ICR</i>	Institutes of the Christian Religion
<i>JSNT</i>	Journal for the Study of the New Testament
<i>LCC</i>	Library of Christian Classics
<i>MQR</i>	Mennonite Quarterly Review
<i>NIB</i>	New Interpreter's Bible
<i>NICNT</i>	New International Commentary on the New Testament
<i>NPNF</i>	Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers
<i>SAMH</i>	Studies in Anabaptist and Mennonite History
<i>TDNT</i>	The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
<i>TNIGTC</i>	The New International Greek Testament Commentary
<i>WBC</i>	Word Biblical Commentary

Introduction

“WE ARE NOT ANIMALS!! Clean up after you!” If this staffroom notice indicates anything, it is that natural law never seems to go away. Its most recent “eternal return”¹ in relation to positive law dates from the Nuremberg Trials.² More recently, the new natural law theory has sought its rehabilitation in personal ethics.³

“Jesus. Prophet of Islam.” This billboard likewise indicates the enduring public interest in Jesus, despite attempts by more secular cultures to place an interdiction upon his public presence. Within the church this christological focus has increased as some confessions that have inherited classical trinitarian forms desert them for a more contemporary Jesus style.

However, the relationship between natural law and radical christological ethics is more often a fraught conversation than a respectful corationalism. This thesis offers a modest christological rapprochement of this relationship.⁴

A brief overview will help delineate the argument.

Natural law is here divided into two broad types, the protological and teleological. The protological emphasizes human origins, the teleological human ends and purposes. Both understand human nature as the primary object of moral enquiry. Their concern to establish a ubiquitous, real and perduring base for human ethics is well justified, especially in the light of dehumanizing political and social practices. However, their claim to transparent moral self-evidence is a burdened venture in the light of vigorous

1 Murray, *We Hold These Truths*, 295–336.

2. Thielicke, *Theological Ethics*, 384.

3. See Finnis, *Fundamentals of Ethics, Moral Absolutes, and Natural Law and Natural Rights*; Grisez, *Fulfillment in Christ*; Black, *Christian Moral Realism*; Biggar and Black, *Revival of Natural Law*.

4. Hauerwas et al, “Natural Law, Tragedy and Theological Ethics,” in *Truthfulness and Tragedy*, 57–70.

moral disagreements, which indicate incommensurable rational traditions and *a priori* presuppositions about reality.⁵ Yet even within this debate, natural law theories tend to be silent about Jesus.

This project suggests that any ethical theory that takes human nature, and that which is proper to it, as its base criterion, cannot avoid the con-substantial humanity of the incarnate eternal *Logos*, Jesus Christ, if it is to be properly Christian. The principle of adjectival congruence applies: as Aristotle is proper to Aristotelian ethics, Christ is proper to Christian ethics.

Because classical Christology affirms the perfect nature of Christ's humanity, practical moral reasoning about the goodness that is proper to human nature and action is unsound if this nature is avoided. Understanding health precedes remedial prescription. In this regard, the radical Anabaptist tradition is rightly centered on christological moral reasoning.

Yet this focus on Jesus tends towards sectarianism due to its perceived historicism, and the voluntarism of its "discipleship ethics."⁶ When Jesus is put in his particular cultural and religious place, his universal and substantive claims are minimized. The modern understanding of the individual as essentially self-determining exacerbates this.⁷ Explicit christological ethical claims are thus considered intrusions of personal opinions into public moral space. A reticent moral posture may result, particularly in secular and pluralistic contexts.⁸

Furthermore, embracing Jesus as morally normative is possible without holding a classical two-nature Christology. Such a "religious-ethical" Christology is noted for both the "modesty of its soteriological interest," and also for "rejecting . . . all metaphysical elements in the doctrine of God."⁹ Whereas natural law typically overlooks the human Jesus, christological ethics may easily become theologically minimalist because of a hesitancy regarding Jesus' divinity. While natural law tends to avoid the Gospels altogether, radical ethics tends to avoid John, the primary source of "Alexandrian" and Chalcedonian *Logos* Christology.

5. See MacIntyre: *Whose Justice?, After Virtue*, and *Three Rival Versions*.

6. For instance, Spohn, *Go and Do Likewise*, 10: "Disciples become apprentices of someone who knows what they need to learn."

7. O'Donovan, *Resurrection*, 16–18.

8. This holds even though all claims to truth have universal intent; see Newbigin, *Truth to Tell*.

9. Pannenberg, *Jesus—God and Man*, 45, and *Basic Questions in Theology*, 99, on Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Metaphysics here means basic principles of reality as a whole, including God. Ontology is a subset of metaphysics concerning sentient and intelligent being.

Part One discusses and upholds the enduring appeal of natural law, yet argues that its “christological lack” renders it inadequate as a Christian ethic. Part Two appraises and affirms the christological focus of radical Anabaptist ethics, yet argues that its tendency towards a “metaphysical lack” destabilizes its universal appeal. Both of these parts are mainly analytical and evaluative.

Part Three proposes a rapprochement between these two ethics through Chalcedon’s *logos* and double *homoousios* Christology. It discusses the relationship between being and act, the concept of the *logos* in John’s Gospel, and *logos* cosmology and reasoning. Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* is discussed as it may bear upon the subject.¹⁰

Because the project is christological, there is little attention given to the Spirit and Father. This does not indicate a lack of awareness of how these may be worthwhile areas for more research. In particular, a Spirit anthropology would provide further significant ways of reframing the ethics of human nature in a Christian fashion.

10. This project is not an exhaustive account of Barth’s ethics.

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Part One

Natural Law Christian Ethics

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I

Philosophical, Theological and Biblical Considerations

1. Introduction

NATURAL LAW AFFIRMS THAT both nature generally, and human nature specifically, are intrinsically and inherently ethical. Human value consists in and is simultaneous to its factuality, constituting it an ontological and ethical realist theory. Thus three alternatives are discounted: the Humean rejection of value-laden facts, the Cartesian separation of objective fact and subjective value, and existentialism's voluntarist manufacture of post-existence essence. Natural law affirms moral existence and moral essence as simultaneously co-inherent.

Historicism rejects natural law's metaphysical realism along with its static anthropology: historical consciousness opposes both *mythos* (primordial creation dramas legitimizing static social order and nature, including the human), and the realist philosophies of antiquity (the eternal and timeless *one* against the changing *many*, as seen in Parmenides and Plato).¹ "The mythic focus on primordial time gave human beings security against the uncertain historical future," while philosophy "identified the essential with the abiding," with both sharing "a reserve towards history."² Accordingly,

1. Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 495–502. For a sustained debate with and trinitarian critique of the Parmenidean *one* and Heraclidean *many*, see Gunton, *The One, The Three and the Many*.

2. Pannenberg, *Anthropology*, 497.

natural law as a form of substantive ethics is one center of an elliptical debate, with historicism and its dynamic developmentalism the other center.

The contemporary renaissance of natural law's realism contests four expressions of historicism: first, unjust state positivism; second, various forms of moral subjectivism and non-cognitivism; third, the perceived failure of the enlightenment ethical project; and fourth, ethnology's culture-specific diversity undergirding relativism. The critique of positivism is based on the thesis that human rights, grounded in human nature, are pre-legal.³ This echoes Cicero, discussed below. In all four cases, human ontology, understood as invariant, singular and real, acts to correct perceived unstable societal practices, historicism and unjust legal positivism.

Non-theistic contemporary natural law theory is predicated "on the supposition that reality is completely rational and can be known by human reason." This realist rationalism provides non-theological legitimacy for the "continuation of the natural law in the circumstances created by the modern consciousness of freedom,"⁴ sustaining commensurable cross-ideological rational moral discourse in a non-theistic setting.⁵ Thus "the term 'natural law' in the context of moral theology also denotes a 'cognitive' ethics, or one 'guided by reason,' which claims to be able to distinguish between good and evil, and correct and false, in such a way that it establishes substantial norms."⁶ By contesting non-cognitivism it implies that reason is itself moral and not dependent upon external moral foundations or canons.

This thesis functions with a *duplex* taxonomy of natural law: protological and teleological. They are not mutually opposed and may be combined. Both theories tend to ontological and instrumental optimism.⁷ However, three factors render protological natural law currently problematic: first, the contested views of human origins and therefore essence and existence; second, the modern situation of free historical consciousness, which opposes natural law's static character that is grounded in the two presuppositions of non-developmental fixed realist human ontology, and a realist metaphysic

3. On Nazi Germany's strong positivist legal culture eclipsing natural law: "It is tragically significant that the country where formal jurisprudence was developed to its utmost perfection was also the country where legality offered least resistance to the challenge of new and disruptive forces." A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy*, 105, in Montgomery, *Jurisprudence*, no pagination. Recourse to natural law indicates a crisis in history according to Thielicke, *Ethics*. 149–150.

4. Schockenhoff, *Natural Law*, 2–3.

5. This is a function of natural law in Hauerwas, *After Christendom?*, 58. Also Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law*, 7.

6. Schockenhoff, *Natural Law*, 2.

7. Calvin however has a mixed view, below.

of divine immutable ontology; and third (as a more specific form of the second), the postmodern malleable and decentered self. Thus contemporary natural law theories tend to be non-eschatologically teleological (ends), rather than metaphysical (origins), as universal human goods and ends are more perspicuous, historically adventurous and less controversial than protological claims. Primary consideration will be given to Cicero and Calvin as protological theorists, and Aristotle,⁸ Augustine and Aquinas as teleological theorists, as well as the new natural law theory of the Finnis school.

Two recent attempts to soften natural law's realism with virtue ethics are Boyd's and Black's. Boyd argues that virtue ethics needs a proper understanding of human nature, and natural law needs the warmth of structured human relationships in the virtues. Human relations and deontological rules exist reciprocally, but the relational element is primary (e.g., "Sabbath made for man").⁹ Black argues that Hauerwas and Grisez are "capable of functioning as mutually enriching . . . forms of ethics."¹⁰ As virtue ethics are often teleological — "What type of person do I want to become?" — this is unsurprising.

Because natural law is primarily a realist ethic, the philosophical matters of critical realism and naturalism will be first examined, followed by theological and biblical concerns.

2. Philosophical Considerations

a. Critical Moral Realism

The emergence of critical realism in the twentieth century has enabled the confident determination of theology from its own material content.¹¹ This project utilizes McGrath's tri-dimensional critical realism in developing christological ethics: it is metaphysical, "there exists a reality or realities . . .

8. "Aristotle and the Stoics formulated a comprehensive way of thinking about human life that has had enormous influence on European thought," Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics*, 45. That Paul's anthropology and ethics only becomes coherent when seen as expressing the basic structure of Stoicism, 33, 46, may overstate the case. This structure is threefold: the "I" as unconverted, converted, and new, 33–44.

9. Boyd, *Shared Morality*, 255. When quoted, "man" retained throughout to avoid anachronism.

10. Black, *Christian Moral Realism*, 316.

11. Barth being the pioneer. McKenzie and Myers, "Dialectical Critical Realism," 49–66, discuss theological and scientific realism. Also La Montagne, *Barth and Rationality*, 118: "For Barth, the reality of God in revelation actively criticizes all our knowledge."

independent of and external to the enquiring human mind”; epistemological, “this reality can be known”; and semantic, “this reality may be depicted . . . at least as approximations to the truth.”¹² Neo-Kantian object-skepticism is thus rejected. Porter’s term is “speculative realism,” which she contrasts with what she sees as the naïve realism of McGrath.¹³ Rasmussen’s theory is bi-dimensional, consisting of ontological realism (the existence of beings, rather than reality more broadly conceived) that grounds epistemological realism (the knowledge of the existence and nature of these beings).¹⁴ La Montagne’s typology has two constitutive elements in four basic propositions. As realism, it asserts a) the reality of the other-in-itself, and b) that the knowing subject can have real knowledge of the world. As critical, it a) asserts that all such knowledge is mediated, and b) requires a critical theory about the nature and limits of all knowledge.¹⁵

Critical realism affirms that “genuine knowledge in any field involves knowledge of that field in accordance with the realities with which we have to do in it, and knowledge of those realities in terms of their internal relations or intrinsic structures.”¹⁶ In this situation, the object or objective field determines the subject’s epistemology and semantics: epistemology (the knowing subject’s apprehension) and semantics (the subject’s description) are parasitic upon, determined by and congruent with metaphysics/ontology (the knowable object), yet are open to cross-discourse description. Rationality is thus not a justifying criterion that exists external to that which is being investigated, but lies within the object and its attendant fields. Thus entities and their relations impose upon the observer their own reality and configuration, thereby shaping the mind’s theoretical structure and object-specific description of that object.¹⁷ Accordingly, “a disclosure model in natural science is a conceptual construct forced upon us by the intrinsic intelligibility of some field as we inquire into it, and it is developed as a theory through which we seek to let the structures of that field disclose themselves to us.”¹⁸ This is depicted biblically in Psalm 19:1–6 where the heavens and skies (the subject, v. 1) declare (v. 2–4) the glory of God and the work of his

12. McGrath, *Scientific Theology*, vol. 1, 75–76.

13. Porter, *Nature as Reason*, 57–68.

14. Douglas B. Rasmussen, “The Importance of Metaphysical Realism for Ethical Knowledge,” in Paul et al., *Objectivism*, 56, n. 4.

15. La Montagne, *Barth and Rationality*, 14–16.

16. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 146.

17. The significance of relations is explored by Polkinghorne, *Trinity and Entangled World*, 1–14.

18. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 125.

hands (the object, v. 1). Hence the ontological reality (God's glory) and the physical reality (his work) coordinate and co-inhere. This disclosure model is not limited to natural science, but extends to all forms of human knowing. Calvin expresses this regarding Scripture: "The same Spirit, therefore, who has spoken through the mouths of the prophets must penetrate into our hearts to persuade us that they faithfully proclaimed what had been divinely commanded."¹⁹ Calvin here approximates Irenaeus's coordination of the Father's two hands, for both the Word (Gen 1:3; Ps 33:6a) and the Spirit (Gen 1:2, 2:7; Ps 33:6b, 104:30) create and sustain creation. Not only does this mean that creation is intelligible and open to rational description, but that this coherent intelligibility extends to the moral dimension of creation because *Logos* and *Pneuma*, the agents of creation, are not Stoic or Hegelian abstractions respectively, but the moral persons of the Son and Holy Spirit. Because the Spirit is coordinate with the Word (Ps 33:6), there is neither a subjective departure from reason, nor a rationalistic abandonment of subjectivity.

Thus if viewed spatially, critical moral realism elliptically unites objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism affirms there "is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness and rightness," while subjectivism avers that "when we turn to the examination of those concepts . . . —whether it is the concept of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, the good, or norms—we are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture."²⁰ Similar is Polanyi's theory of personal knowledge where the "personal and objective are fused . . . in the act of establishing contact with reality."²¹ By disabling the view that rationality is an external reality to which all disciplines must be subjected, critical realism established that the knowing and describing of any object or relation is internal to that object or relation, and also rehabilitated fallibilism as epistemologically acceptable.²² Such critical realism means that the Incarnation renders obsolete any sense that the objective and subjective are *exclusive* polarities, as their contested claims become the one claim of the enfleshed Word, the objective as the subjective, the divine object of the Word as the divinely knowing

19. Calvin, *ICR*, I.vii.4.

20. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism*, 8.

21. Thomas F. Torrance, "Notes on Terms and Concepts," in *Belief in Science*, 141.

22. McCormack in La Montagne, *Barth and Rationality*, viii.

subject of the flesh, of the ahistorical eternal Word as the historical incarnate Word. Jesus knows the eternal *Logos* because he is internal to it.

Moreover, the structured order and thus intelligibility of the creation is implied in biblical monotheism, in contrast with the “anarchia” and “polyarchia” of pagan religious philosophy, which produced a world without order and a world of fractious order, respectively, and thus dissolution. “Only a divine ‘monarchia,’ therefore, could salvage order in the world.”²³ The Cappadocians “posited a fundamental philosophical connection between the correct doctrine about God’s being and the quest for the world order,” although not without classical antecedent.²⁴ Furthermore, and akin to Torrance, “as the ‘Maker of heaven and earth,’ God was ‘the Creator even of the essence of beings,’ not merely ‘an inventor of figures’ but the Creator of ‘the *ousia* with the form [eideis].”²⁵ Thus the co-inherence of form and being in God is the philosophical basis for a similar co-inherence in creation as a whole. Such a creative process possesses three aspects: 1) the divine idea of any *ousia* included both its form and matter; 2) the divine creation of matter in its form; and 3) the systematic coherence of form and matter in each *ousia*, and also between all created realities. Thus “one *ousia*” underlies all humanity.²⁶ Hence in the *Logos ensarkos*, the divine order and coherence of creation’s (especially humanity’s) form and matter became focused in an unprecedented fashion such that natural law as that which is proper to human nature is necessarily christological. In contrast, voluntarism, positivism and constructivism tend to tease apart the co-inherence of form and matter, subject and object. They do this by imposing *a priori* presuppositions and semantics that are alien to and non-congruent with the object. This subjective determination separates moral matter from moral form: being formally human corresponds to no material human morality, enabling the decentered self to freely determine its own moral nature that may be alien to its real humanity.

Critical moral realism differs from both naïve metaphysical realism and constructivism. First, simple or naïve metaphysical realism acknowledges the real existence of things but denies real knowledge or description of them due to the theory-laden character of all knowledge and language,

23. Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 77; citing Gregory Nazianzus, *Orationes*, 29.2 (SC 250:178). Eastern trinitarianism locates God’s unity in the Father’s monarchy, rather than in a single *ousia* as in Western, particularly contemporary, theology. This reflects the Bible’s emphasis on persons rather than substance.

24. *Ibid.*, 91, 94.

25. *Ibid.*, 97; citing Gr. Nyss. *Hom.opif.29* (PG 44:233), *Bas. Hex.2.3* (SC 26:148).

26. *Ibid.*, 97.

rendering realism not false but unintelligible.²⁷ This reflects the modernist precedence of the human subject over objective entities. However, Rasmussen unnecessarily assumes that all such theory-laden knowledge is non-congruent with objects, being inevitably constructed in such a fashion that it imposes consciously or unconsciously upon, rather than reflecting, the object. Thus, while appearing epistemologically modest it betrays a form of anthropocentric hegemony over objects, for it fails to acknowledge that the human mind may be acted upon and truthfully shaped, not wholly passively, but in an object-determined and congruent fashion. The relationship between the mind and objects is dialectical, the primary status being accorded to the object, and the subject functioning with a listening attitude towards the object or reality, being obediently receptive to disclosed forms, structures and laws. Thus, in moral terms, receptive object-determined epistemology is an intellectual virtue possessing the moral character of humility, while a constructivist, imposed, object-nondetermination (or subject-determination) epistemology is the moral vice of pride.

Similarly, yet more radically, critical moral realism contrasts with perspectival constructivism, which functions from acknowledged *a priori* pre-suppositions and non-congruent thought-forms imposed upon the object. Such imposition has nominalist overtones by denying that entities belong to *a priori* kinds, and allows arbitrary predication and description of entities and their relations. Here the object-determined yet dialectical mode is replaced by a subject-determined positivism where objects are forced to fit pre-existing beliefs. This epistemology leads to an impasse in understanding, unresolvable anomalies, a false interpretation, or the final collapse of the theory and its replacement by a better explanation that accords with the object itself. An example would be the reduction of persons to economic utility, which finally collapses due to the universal valuing of financially dependent persons such as the chronically unemployable.

In contrast to both naive metaphysical realism and constructivism, critical moral realism maintains an object-subject dialectic, “where the human being and nature interact, affect, and influence each other . . . [here] the emphasis is . . . on the relation, the interaction that brings the different entities together into community and communion.”²⁸

Critical realism is thus not naïve realism (Porter’s mis-description of McGrath), which is more appropriately attributable to forms of natural

27. Douglas B. Rasmussen, “The Importance of Metaphysical Realism,” in Paul et al., *Objectivism*, 61; describing Hilary Putman’s position, which is akin to Kantian skepticism, and historicism.

28. Argyris Nicolaidis, “Relational Nature,” in Polkinghorne, *Trinity and Entangled World*, 95.

law possessing an optimistic anthropology and a high epistemology of self-evidence. The tendency in these forms is to conflate natural law with convention, as Augustine does with slavery, noted below. Reformed thought is ambiguous here: its negative hamartiology preferences divine commands over natural law (e.g., Barth), yet its strong theology of general revelation, common grace and providence may support natural law.²⁹ In contrast, McGrath and Torrance have produced Reformed critical realist approaches, McGrath from the natural sciences and Torrance from theoretical science, the key distinction from naïve realism being the predicate “critical.”

Torrance’s fundamental principle is that “we know things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves; and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the content and form of our knowledge.”³⁰ Thus “nature must be courted, not imposed upon.”³¹ This is theologically derived: God is known as God (being) in his self-disclosure (act) to those who attend to him in the epistemic mode congruent to his essential nature found in his self-revelation (faith). This process applies to all aspects of his good creation as reflecting his character. Thus human nature is revealed and understood as one entity within and one aspect of the matrix of divine created reality, bearing the *imago Dei*. This being so, Christian metaphysical realism implies ontological realism: or to put it another way, divine ontological realism implies human ontological realism. Hence Torrance: “Laws of nature are thus the dogmas that are imposed on the scientific mind by the immanent rationality of the universe.”³² Such rationality is inherent in the universe by the act of its creation by the intelligent and intelligible rational Creator, not by hypostasizing the universe, as in Cicero. Thus the knowledge of the moral world is *formally* identical to the knowledge of God in that both epistemologies are determined by canons of rationality that lie, not external to God or humanity, but internal to them as necessary elements of their reality.

Similarly regarding jurisprudence, Torrance attacks legal positivism on the basis of Einsteinian science’s “unity of being and form, or substance and structure . . . in every sphere of human enquiry” which involves the “integration of ontology and epistemology in rigorous fidelity to the fact that empirical and theoretical factors are found already inhering in one another

29. As in Grabill’s *Rediscovering the Natural Law*.

30. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 8. Barth’s argument with Harnack concerned theology’s proper object and its knowledge: Busch, *Karl Barth*, 147, 165–166.

31. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 9.

32. *Ibid.*, 51.

in objective reality.³³ Rejecting the Greek bifurcation of reasoning (theoretical and practical reasoning) which legitimizes the detachment of formal law from its content and objective ground³⁴ (contrary to Athanasian *logos* theology³⁵), he suggests that jurisprudence should “seek to ground judicial law in the objective intelligibilities of that created reality.”³⁶ This echoes Ciceronian natural law (noted below) but with a modern scientific justification. Torrencian scientific realism thus suggests that contingent positive law ought to possess science’s internal structure if it is to escape the pitfalls of arbitrariness, a key concern of natural lawyers and justice advocates. Extended to natural law, this suggests moral structures are inherent in reality as the result of God’s free and morally good act of creation as expressing his essential being. Consequently humanity, as one aspect of this created reality, possesses moral freedom (as a form) as an element of its substantial nature (its being) as the *imago Dei* so that human moral freedom is freedom to be, realize and reflect its nature.³⁷

Consequently, moral realism is congruent with Christian theology as one aspect of creation’s intelligibility. To affirm scientific realism while denying moral realism repeats the errors of both Greek rational bifurcation (theoretical verses practical reasoning)³⁸ and the Cartesian split of fact and value. As science reveals the intrinsic coherent intelligibility of the universe’s physical essence and form, ethics reveals the coherent inherent intelligibility of its moral essence and form. In traditional theology, this has been described as the general revelation of moral goods, laws and rules.

There lies a problem with natural law’s rationalism, however, and it concerns the human will. Two volition-based problems exist: will-to-power (hubris), and will-enfeeblement (sloth).³⁹ Nietzschean will-to-power can be seen in forms of purposive theory-laden constructivism in hard sciences

33. Torrance, *Juridical Law*, 24–25. Torrance proposes physical/scientific realism as a model for a realist corrective of Lockean and Benthamite legal positivism, and hence ethics.

34. *Ibid.*, 30.

35. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 151.

36. Torrance, *Juridical Law*, 33.

37. So John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendour*.

38. For a discussion of the relation between the two, see Germaine Paulo Walsh, “The Problematic Relation between Practical and Theoretical Virtue in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*,” in Grasso and Hunt, *Moral Enterprise*, 59–81. Walsh is an inclusivist: human eudemonia in Aristotle is a composite of both practical and theoretical virtue, because human nature is composite.

39. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII, 1–10, sees sloth (his “incontinence”) as incompatible with practical reasoning.

(fudging the data to support the hypothesis), and politically skewed statistics, as well as ethical voluntarist positivism. Will-enfeeblement is seen in the Pauline self-woe oracle of Romans 7.⁴⁰ In contrast, both naïve ethical epistemic realism and simple rationalistic ethics deny will-enfeeblement, holding that moral knowledge leads inexorably to moral acts, despite empirical observations indicating otherwise.⁴¹ This problem of the will in most natural law theories constitutes one of its basic omissions, whereas christological ethics that include pneumatology take both will-to-power and will-enfeeblement seriously through the doctrines of repentance and regeneration.

In this respect, 2 Peter 2:12 describes some human behavior as expressing the irrational behavior of animals.⁴² Such an association of irrationality, ignorance and nature suggests human nature can be degraded by unnatural practices or orientations contrary to proper reason, necessitating critical modification of naïve or absolute realism regarding nature.⁴³ However, this modification is not nominalistic or hard-constructivist grounded upon conscious *a priori* imposed presuppositions, but responds to entities and reality within constraints: the moral task is constructivist in an object-determined fashion. This is a form of epistemic fallibilism but not skepticism, for it asserts the truth of its propositions and the possibility of true knowledge, whereas skepticism denies both. It also differs from absolute or naïve realism in its openness to modification by new object-related information or more adequate description, as well as from revelation: it holds its truth more modestly. Thus, *aloga* softens excessive realist claims.

40. The identity of the self is immaterial here.

41. As seen in humanism's social panacea, education, and certain catechetics where Bible knowledge *sans* other means of grace guarantees sanctification.

42. That instincts are negatively attributed to irrational animals suggests they are not equivalent to proper natural human inclinations.

43. "Knowledge is constructed by fallible humans in particular social contexts, and . . . our knowledge is at the best approximate" (McKenzie and Myers, "Dialectical Critical Realism," 49). The moral aspects of irrationalism and ignorance are highlighted in 2 Peter 2:12–22. Reason "supplies . . . moral alibis and *ex post facto* rationalizations which serve its purpose," like a harlot serving desire (Thielicke, *Ethics*, 142). Smith attempts to rehabilitate the Augustinian model of persons as "embodied agents of desire or love" over reason: "we are fundamentally non-cognitive affective creatures" (Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 47, 53). Henriksen locates desire in God (his wish for human fellowship) and in the synoptic love command, which is fulfilled eschatologically (Henriksen, *Desire, Gift and Recognition*, 27–38, 125–32). The insatiability of normative desire makes it possible for us "to enjoy the creation more fully and enduringly" (Jan-Olav Henriksen, "Desire: Gift and Giving," in Shults and Henriksen, *Saving Desire*, 6).

Consequently natural law can be understood as the critically real knowledge and description of the divine and human moral natures. Yet because objects determine such knowledge and description, natural law miscarries as a Christian ethic to the extent that it excludes Christ's two natures as the proper object of such inquiry. Because critical realism implies that natural law's rationality is internal to these two natures, Jesus Christ is the focal instance of natural law. Critical realism also contests Humean ethical skepticism, which is now assessed.

b. The Naturalistic Axiom

Moral realism's naturalistic axiom ("ought" being derivable from "is") has been problematic since its Humean fallacious critique. As the object(s) of theoretical reasoning are prior realities, and the object(s) of practical reasoning are yet-to-be realities originating in human action, the two forms of reasoning are considered logically incommensurable: see Table 1.

Factor	Is	Ought
Type of reasoning	<i>Theoretical</i>	<i>Practical</i>
Object of reasoning	<i>Pre-existent</i>	<i>Consequent</i>
Goal of reasoning	<i>Truth</i>	<i>Good</i>
Purpose	<i>Knowledge</i>	<i>Action</i>
Linguistic form	<i>Descriptive</i>	<i>Evaluative</i>
Grammatical mood	<i>Indicative</i>	<i>Imperative</i>
Anthropology	<i>Mind</i>	<i>Body</i>

Table 1: Aristotelian Bifurcated Rationality

One novelty of the Finnis-Grisez school is their affirmation of both moral realism and the naturalistic fallacy, the latter based on Aristotelian bifurcated rationality.⁴⁴ As any conclusion must be implicit in its premises, it is asserted that practical reasoning cannot be grounded in theoretical reasoning, as the latter contains no practical element.

Where practical conclusions appear derivable from theoretical premises, Black asserts that the premise contains a hidden practical (i.e., ethical) component, which makes the ethical conclusion appear logically derivable

44. On natural lawyers having shown that ethical norms are derivable from facts, Black states: "They have not, nor do they need to, nor did the classical exponents of the theory dream of attempting any such derivation," *Moral Realism*, 33. Despite this, Finnis rejects the Humean subjectivist interpretation of ethics, *Fundamentals*, 27, 57-8.

from the theoretical premise.⁴⁵ This presupposes that truly descriptive statements are necessarily ethically empty, and that ethically true statements are descriptively vacuous. Yet this disjunction is problematic because such abstraction “imposes on thought a dualism between form and matter or structure and being which gives rise to a formalistic and artificial picture of things.”⁴⁶ It is preferable to see reason as simply an abstract noun which describes a single human activity in variegated forms: bifurcated modalities of reasoning are philosophically interesting, but are non-descriptive of actual reasoning, for people reason dialectically both indicatively and imperatively.⁴⁷ The following statement is illustrative:

God is,
I ought to love God.⁴⁸

The Humean tradition asserts this statement as logically fallacious, yet it expresses Jesus’ love command. Black’s contention that the premise contains an implicit ethical dimension is grammatically untrue, and the naturalistic fallacy is an analytic/linguistic argument. Even if the premise is predicated as in the synoptic Gospels (“Lord,” “your God,” and “one”), it is still a descriptive statement: “Lord” is a name, “your God” describes a pre-existing covenant relation, and “one” is numerical or metaphysical, thus non-evaluative.

The command’s antecedent (Deut 6:4) inverts the order: the imperative “Hear, O Israel” precedes the indicative “The Lord your God, the Lord is one.” Here the practical reasoning demands assent to an object of theoretical reasoning. However, if logical deduction from reality to practice is fallacious, logical induction from practice to reality is equally fallacious, so that urging (the ethical imperative) acceptance of any reality (the realist indicative) is fallacious. Thus, “You must accept (ought, imperative mood, ethical, practical reasoning) you have cancer (is, indicative mood, realistic, theoretical reasoning),” is fallacious and illogical. This is contra self-evident.

The premise “God is” is linguistically indicative and an instance of theoretical reasoning, yet the lexical item “God” is moral by definition.⁴⁹ Thus Black is right in suggesting that the above premise has an ethical com-

45. Black, *Moral Realism*, 27–33.

46. Torrance, “Notes,” *Belief in Science*, 133.

47. Combining the “theological *cum* ‘cosmological’” and ethical, Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul*, 6.

48. “God is our Father, we ought to hallow his name,” is Phillips’s is/ought example. His argument proceeds from the institution of human fatherhood and the moral obligation of children: “God and Ought,” in Ramsay *Christian Ethics*, 133–139. Black rejects Phillips; see Black, *Moral Realism*, 26–33.

49. Barth’s reworking of “God is” as “God loves” is discussed in Part Three.

ponent, although it is arguable whether that component is hidden. Whilst the language is indicative/theoretical, the content is not, demonstrating the inadequacy of the Humean tradition, which is based on grammar. Therefore while ethical content expressed in ethical/imperative language maintains matter/form congruity (as mathematics expressed in mathematical formula), the necessity of such linguistic congruence is non-absolute. That is, invariant material can be commensurable between multiple linguistic forms and moods: cross-discourse translation is possible. Therefore, while matter/form congruity is a base requirement for any matter to be discourse-coherent (as in Torrance, above), matter/form non-congruity is not excluded so long as it remains secondary to and parasitic upon the congruent forms, thus avoiding voluntarist constructionism. To prioritize descriptive-language premises over prescriptive-language conclusions in ethics constitutes illegitimate descriptive-language hegemony, and begs the question of alternative linguistic hegemonies. To invalidate an argument due to it possessing more than one verbal mood renders language almost useless.

Rather than prioritizing one language form over another, or asserting their separation, maintaining all forms as connected and mutually dependent in a coherent matrix maintains the realist unitive view of the co-inherence of form and substance. It is also a grammatical expression of relational reality. Whilst the separation of the two language forms leads either to existentialism or linguistic philosophy,⁵⁰ their co-inherence maintains the unitary/relational view of moral life and human existence that is lived everyday, enabling commonsense ethics to reason from the way things are to the way people ought to act.

Furthermore, considered analytically, “God” is lexically vacuous. Although nouns have meaning on their own, such meaning implies the noun’s internal self-predication. Self-evidence means a predicate is contained in the subject itself. For instance, the ontological argument predicates greatness to “God” for the purpose of the argument. When confronted by a lexically unpredicated subject that appears non self-evident, the reader supplies a predicate to create meaning. Thus the noun “God” begs the question, “What or who is ‘God’?” And as non-contradiction is the only rule governing predication, ethical predication cannot be excluded. Therefore the term “God” in the above premise “God is” can be legitimately understood morally, as in Barth’s “God loves.” As Thomas states, “Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject.” For Thomas a human is self-evidently a “rational Being.”⁵¹ Simi-

50. Torrance, *Ground and Grammar*, 32–5.

51. Aquinas, *ST*, Ia2æ, q. 94. 2.

larly, “God” is self-evidently understood as morally “good.” Thus Thomas’s attribution to Boethius: “Certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all”,⁵² and Aristotle: “Since ‘good’ has as many senses as ‘being’ (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason).”⁵³ Substantive good, when attributed to God, takes on a moral sense, necessarily. In Barthian terms, the term “God” is non-substantive, anti-realist, arbitrary and fictional unless predicated as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, known as moral through his self-revelation. Thus “God is” contains moral meaning even though its grammatical form is otherwise. Therefore deducting imperative conclusions (an “ought”) from linguistically descriptive premises (an “is”) is non-fallacious and ethically legitimate when God is the premise.

We cite five further arguments against the Humean tradition. First, the assertion that ethical actions cannot be logically based upon prior real beliefs contests natural mental inclinations and reasoning. “I must move the baby,” is a natural ethical response to “There’s a baby on the road.” To assert that it contains an implicit ethical premise (“babies are precious”) illustrates the point above: that descriptive language often contains ethical content. To declare, “You moved the baby off the road due to illogical reasoning,” would be met with universal offence, for if the reasoning upon which a morally good act is based is illogical, the moral agent is illogically motivated. Thus morally good acts are patronizingly accused of fallaciousness, which is pejorative and unethical.

Second, the fallacy renders theological propositions ethically inert, contrary to the biblical use of therefore (*οὖν, oun*) which links the theologically indicative to the paraenetic imperative moods.⁵⁴ The acts of *heilsgeschichte* provide the indicative justification for the imperatives of the Decalogue (Exod 20:1–2), the psalmist’s call to worship (Ps 81:1–5), and prophetic oracles (Isa 1:2–3). Jesus’ initial preaching (Mark 1:15) consists of a foundational double perfect followed by a consequent double imperative. The imperative, “Be perfect,” is predicated upon (*οὖν*) the fact that God in heaven “is perfect” (Matt 6:48). The merciful activity of God (Rom 9–11) is the antecedent basis (*οὖν*) of Paul’s exhortation (Rom 12:1–21). Finally “the end of all things is at hand, therefore (*οὖν*) keep sane and sober in your prayers” (1 Pet 4:7, RSV) contains a descriptive eschatological premise

52. Ibid.

53. Aristotle, *Nicomachean*, I. 6. 1096a15.

54. Hauerwas is noted as an exponent, Black, *Moral Reasoning*, 7. Pauline paraenesis (imperative) urges the actualization of the new self (indicative), Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul*, 8.

(the “end”) in the indicative mood and an imperative ethical conclusion (“keep sane and sober”). Verb mood cannot be the criterion of logical moral discourse.

Third, the naturalistic fallacy excludes ethical texts as sources for practical moral reasoning, because such texts preexist the act of moral reasoning and therefore cannot act as bases for the moral action that they themselves actually encourage. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is rendered illogical, as it purports to be a true description (theoretical reasoning) about the good (practical reasoning). Likewise, Scripture becomes morally incoherent when it states that “these things happened to them to serve as an example and they were written down to instruct us on whom the ends of the ages have come,” (1 Cor 10:11). The fallacy renders textual moral argument and exhortation ethically inert.

Fourth, the naturalistic fallacy excludes past good actions (which exist prior to the act of reasoning) as sources for practical moral reasoning, as no ought is derivable from past events. Yet such actions constitute an “is” and are capable of plural descriptions in multiple discourses. A youth assisting an elderly person can be described psychologically (operant conditioning), politically (community welfare), and religiously (honoring elders). However, the naturalistic fallacy denies that such behavior is explicable by the youth as copying his father—“Dad did it (an ‘is’), so I should too” (an ‘ought’)—without it being labeled logically fallacious. It follows that to draw any psychological, political or religious consequences is also necessarily fallacious, unless there are equivalent psychological, political or religious hidden premises. Therefore all conclusions cognate to their premises (e.g., political conclusions of a political premise) are logically fallacious if such conclusions contain an imperative. The fallacy renders all descriptions (premises) as non-objective, non-descriptive and thus materially inconsistent (i.e., hidden imperative) with their form (grammatically descriptive). This is counterintuitive: for instance, government surveys consist of description (the “is” of quantitative research) followed by recommendations (“oughts”) to maximize human goods.

Fifth, if hortatory language is logically not derivable from description, exhortation is non-substantive and circularly self-referential. Yet exhortation begs the question, “*Why* should I do that?” To answer that doing so is a self-evident good is unhelpful for three reasons. First, “*Why?*” a central question in moral discussion, implies non-self-evidence: self-evidence renders “*Why?*” redundant, necessarily. Second, “*Why?*” expects a realistic and substantive answer, the questioner being insulted if a purely hortatory answer is repeated. Third, citing self-evident goods constitutes a substantive

answer, which it is argued cannot function as a premise for imperatives, which renders such argument illogical.

Consequently, the naturalistic axiom is sustainable and arguments based on bifurcated reasoning are problematic, theoretically inconsistent, and unwarranted by biblical literary forms and practical living. Critical moral realism rejects bifurcated reasoning which separates essence/substance/being from form/structure/act, and the indicative from the imperative, asserting that critical real knowledge of real being(s), entities and their relations, and reality, exists; and necessarily discloses real forms, structures, and acts, including those that are moral; and that these can be properly, although not perfectly, described. It is fallibilistic but not skeptical, and thus open to reassessment. However, it dismisses the view that such real knowledge and description necessarily leads to moral acts due to the problem of the will and *aloga*. Following these philosophical matters, biblical and theological concerns are now assessed.

3. Theological and Biblical Considerations of Nature

a. Nature and Natural

Reason constitutes the essence of human nature in traditional natural law. Such anthropology fails to be sufficiently cognizant of broader non-rational⁵⁵ human dimensions, and as such constitutes a truncated ontology.⁵⁶ MacIntyre convincingly demonstrates that reason is inseparable “from the intellectual and social traditions in which it is embodied,”⁵⁷ which leads to “rival conceptions of rationality, both theoretical and practical.”⁵⁸ Similarly, there are contested theological, biblical and material conceptions of nature, although they all function to legitimize an action as proper.

Natural law differs from natural theology by its object. Natural law asserts truthful rational moral knowledge of good conduct, whilst natural theology asserts truthful rational theological knowledge of the true God. While both God and the good are inextricably linked, they possess different

55. As distinct from irrational.

56. “Rational action ought therefore to be subject to the control of contemplation, which is exercised through faith,” Augustine, “Reply to Faustus,” 27, 283. Aristotle also qualifies practical rationality by virtue, “virtue in the strict sense . . . involves practical wisdom,” *Nicomachean*, VI. 13. 1144b5. Also Smith, “We are primarily desiring animals,” Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 26.

57. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?*, 8.

58. MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, 13.

focal concerns.⁵⁹ Both are philosophically realist, drawing conclusions from what are considered observable self-evident facts, and both possess an optimistic rationality and concept of conscience, whilst minimizing the epistemological effect of sin.⁶⁰

In theological usage, a transition from the medieval “nature as sacrament” in the neo-Platonic Augustinian synthesis of grace and nature to “nature as object of God’s specific creative acts” in the Reformation is noted by Torrance. “In the former outlook the world was interpreted in its attraction to God, in the latter it was interpreted in God’s action upon the world.”⁶¹ This action means that “man and nature belong to the same order of rationality so that when we bring to scientific formalization human relations with nature we lay bare the natural order and structure of created existence.”⁶² Thus the inherent moral structure of human existence is rationally apprehensible as one element of the wider created order, including the opportunity to “ground juridical law in the objective intelligibilities of created reality.”⁶³ Consequently, nature is synonymous with truth and reality, not simply with a surface reading of phenomena.⁶⁴

McGrath proposes a threefold scientific meaning of nature: 1) the realist and scientifically measurable “structures, processes and causal powers” of the physical world; 2) the metaphysical, which “allows humanity to posit its distinctive nature and identity in relation to the non-human”; and 3) a surface concept referring to the ordinary observable phenomena of the world, especially “in modern ecological discourse.”⁶⁵ As in Aristotle, *phusis* is distinct from *techné*.⁶⁶

Furthermore, McGrath establishes that “nature” is a socially constructed polysemous term expressed in historically determined metaphors, proposing the term “creation” as the proper Christian term.⁶⁷ Such polysemy produces conflicting theories of natural law in respect of matter,

59. Because of this difference, Hauerwas’s *With the Grain*, while not without importance, is not a primary text for this thesis.

60. Later Reformed orthodoxy’s more pessimistic doctrines of the noetic effects of sin and the enslaved will are an exception: see the discussion of Calvin later. For a contrary thesis see Grabill, *Rediscovering the Natural Law*.

61. Torrance, *Theological Science*, 67. Thomas’s concept of humanity’s attraction to God-given goods is noted below.

62. *Ibid.*, 298.

63. Torrance, *Juridical Law*, 33.

64. Torrance, *Divine Meaning*, 211, on Athanasius.

65. McGrath, *Scientific Theology*, vol. 1, 82.

66. *Ibid.*, 93–4.

67. *Ibid.*, 102–33. Space prohibits discussion of the biblical term *ktisis*.

means and ends. For instance, Aquinas's human nature (a rational soul), Calvin's prayerfulness (as a necessary means) and The Westminster Confession's chief end (to know God) are not self-evident diachronically, diaconessionally or diaculturally, although not necessarily opposed either. Nature contested is natural law contested.

Boyd offers three meanings of nature: first, "the object of various scientific inquiries that focuses upon explanations of how natural objects and living beings act and are acted upon"; second, "a principle of corruption resulting from a primeval fall of humanity wherein the active power of nature is contrasted with the restorative powers of grace"; and third, "the fulfilment of the natural *telos* embedded in humans in creation; it includes but is not reducible to" nature in his first sense.⁶⁸

O'Donovan offers two proper theological meanings of nature: first, the ontological in contrast with the Hegelian historical; and second, the epistemological in contrast to the revelatory. An improper third meaning refers to fallen humanity.⁶⁹ Both the proper meanings refer to "everything that is not the self-giving of God in Jesus Christ . . . which does not depend directly upon Jesus,"⁷⁰ constituting a sharp distinction between nature (creation), and grace (revelation).

The theological tradition describes human nature in four broad ways, three of which are found in the natural law tradition. First, nature describes *pre-lapsam* humanity (and creation and its goods) and is found in proto-logical natural law theories.⁷¹ Original human *physis*⁷² is a morally good divine creation, and open to truthful rational cognition. Humanity's common *ousia* gives natural law universal significance. Being grounded in creation, it

68. Boyd, *Shared Morality*, 39.

69. O'Donovan, "The Natural Ethic," in Wright, *Essays*, 32–3.

70. *Ibid.*, 33.

71. Rom. 1:26, discussed below.

72. If we augment *physis* with *ousia*, we strengthen the metaphysical basis of the natural law ethic, as every hypostasis possesses its concomitant *ousia* and vice versa. Thus the link between human phenomenology (the focus of ethics in "the modern consciousness of freedom," Schockenhoff, *Natural Law*, 2–3) and human essence is strengthened. This locates any particular hypostasis in a given *physis* or *ousia*, ontologically grounding it. As there is no *physis anhypostasis*, it is not possible to propose a personal ethic agent (hypostasis) separated from its concomitant *ousia* or *physis*, or vice versa. McIntyre cites Aristotle's *Categoriae* c. 5. as the basis for such logic when applied to two-nature Christology: Aristotle's *in rebus* thesis means that forms or universals are neither antecedent to (*ante res*, as in Plato), or posterior to (*post res*, as in nominalism) particulars, but are "only . . . realized in particular subjects." See McIntyre, *Shape of Christology*, 88; see 86–103. Thus universal human *ousia* and *physis* only exists in particular human hypostases.

is prior to and independent of revelation that subsequently attests to it. Thus “the fundamental ethical command imposed on the Christian is precisely to be what he or she is. ‘Be human.’ That is what God asks of us, no more and no less . . . Christian ethics is human ethics, no more and no less.”⁷³

Second, nature refers to *post-lapsam* humanity, the empirical datum of moral reasoning.⁷⁴ This use is uncommon and concedes natural law’s inefficacy due to sin, as with revealed law. In both, the law itself is good, but the human response is noetically or volitionally inadequate, rendering its efficacy ambiguous. An acute sense of this inadequacy was one reason for the breakdown of classical forms of moral reasoning in the Reformation.⁷⁵

Third, nature possesses the eschatological teleological sense of humanity’s final good as the end of the perfective process.⁷⁶ This sense is found in means/ends/goods theories, where humanity’s *telos* determines the natural practices and dispositions that are congruent with—and function instrumentally to attain—such goods and ends. It is common in the New Testament where eschatology frequently functions morally (e.g., 1 Thess 4:17–18), although Christian and classical approaches differ as to the content of the final end. Whereas Aristotle’s *telos* is peaceful social existence, Augustine’s *telos* is the peaceful eschatological vision of God, humanity’s infinite, final and proper good.

The fourth sense, renewed pre-eschatological nature, is insignificant in natural law due to its specific Christology, soteriology and pneumatology which are viewed as sectarian and thus problematic due to compromised ubiquity.⁷⁷ However, the “grace perfecting nature” thesis alleviates this problem, maintaining the priority of nature over grace, of creation over salvation.

The moral standing given to human nature and its capacities determines the status and viability of natural law ethics. *Pre-lapsam* and eschatological emphases contribute to a positive assessment of natural law’s validity and efficacy, as it is reasonable and defensible to build a moral theory upon positively evaluated human data. Anthropologies that stress humanity’s *post-lapsam* situation tend to minimize natural law as a possible source of moral guidance because it is considered incoherent to determine ethical

73. T. O’Connell, *Principles for a Catholic Morality*, 39–40, as cited in Katongole, *Beyond Universal Reason*, 15.

74. Ephesians 2:3, discussed below.

75. So David Solomon’s reading of MacIntyre: see “MacIntyre and Contemporary Moral Philosophy,” in Mark C. Murphy, ed. *Alasdair MacIntyre*, 135.

76. See 2 Peter 1:4, discussed below, regarding human participation in the divine nature.

77. For example, 2 Corinthians 5:17; Colossians 3:10–11, although *physis* is not used.

ideals or moral values from that which is not good. In all approaches, Christianity is minimal.

In common usage, “natural” possesses three general meanings. First, quantitatively, it describes statistical frequency of an act or disposition, meaning common, and implies the normativeness of the act or disposition. “Pre-marital sex is natural” means it is common, conventional. “Natural” is thus quantitatively determined, akin to McGrath’s third sense, with the added sense of moral approval. It is a variety of the naturalistic axiom, whereby the “is” of statistical frequency of acts and/or dispositions implies the “ought” of moral acceptance.

Second: natural means primal, endocrinological, pre-rational, and vital. Such atavism opposes *phusis* to perceived distorting analytical and rationalistic *techné*, and is the opposite to the traditional sense of nature as reason and its governance of negative desire.⁷⁸ Such use is found in hedonic, erotic, and ecstatic theories of the good (e.g., Romanticism), heroic societies of aggression and power, and in Nietzsche.⁷⁹

Third, natural is synonymous with individual subjectivity when qualified by a personal pronoun. For instance, practices previously considered unnatural (in the first and second senses) become natural if psychological dispositions and physical acts are congruent. Congruence implies normativeness: what is natural *for me* is taken as naturalness *per se*, in that particular instance, implying moral approval.⁸⁰

Theological, biblical and common uses of “nature” demonstrate that although it is materially variant, it functions invariantly as a morally legitimizing term, describing a perceived good, thus bearing out Aristotle’s thesis that practical reasoning about human nature is directed to a good. A basic question for Christian natural law is the correct determination of human nature within various biblical contexts, the two locations being the Garden

78. Although “no scholastic would interpret reason in such a way as to drive a wedge between the pre-rational aspects of our nature and rationality,” “these [pre-rational] tendencies may be expressed in ways that are destructive and repugnant,” Porter, *Natural and Divine Law*, 93, 143–146.

79. Berkowitz, *Nietzsche*, 49: Christianity’s moral themes include “an ardent hostility to the instincts, passions.”

80. The unity of desire and reason may indicate reason’s capture by passion. The eighteenth-century transformation of Platonic order (*kata phusis* = *kata logon*) to deist design (*kata phusin* = *kata* sentiments) via subjective inclinations is argued by Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 278–284. Compare Lady Gaga’s apology *Made That Way*: an inclination/disposition becomes morally self-justifying.

or Golgotha.⁸¹ The development of a Chalcedonian determination of human nature, which unites these two locations, occupies Part Three.

b. Φυσις in the New Testament

I. PAUL

Φυσις (*phusis*) is primarily a Pauline term (Rom 1:26, 27; 2:14, 27; 11:21, 24; 1 Cor 11:14; Gal 2:15, 4:8; and Eph 2:3⁸²). Of particular interest is the *κατα φυσιν/παρα φυσιν* (*kata phusin/para phusin*: according to nature/against nature) couplet, the latter taking on “the exclusive sense of ‘instead of.’”⁸³ The *kata/para* usage suggests *phusis* functions as a moral canon that assesses actions as either according to, or against, a basic rule. Like the classical tradition, *phusis* stands in opposition to both dishonorable passions (Rom 1:26) and unnatural desire (v. 27). Christian natural law theories draw primarily upon Romans 2:14–16 and secondarily upon Romans 1:26–27, and are contested.⁸⁴ The theologically rich lexical contexts determine *phusis* as possessing no hypostatic self-existence: for Paul “there is no nature either detached from God or identifiable with God.”⁸⁵ In Romans 2:14–16, Gentile obedience to divine law originates in *phusis* due to the law’s requirements being written in their hearts (v. 15), constituting *phusis* and *kardia* as functional equivalents. The echoes of Jeremiah 31:31 lead Wright to interpret verse 15 as referring to Gentile Christians, meaning *phusis* in verse 14 refers to regenerate Gentile human nature, demonstrating *phusis*’ polysemous character.⁸⁶ But what is written on the heart is not the law but the law’s requirements (v. 14, 15) yet it “has the same goal as the idea of νόμος ἀγραφος, namely, that of setting mankind under an unconditional obligation.”⁸⁷ The validity of this law’s moral judgment is provisionally coordinate with the

81. Schockenhoff, *Natural Law*, 21.

82. Read as Pauline.

83. Käsemann, *Romans*, 48, commenting on Romans 1:26. This parallelism is found in Romans 1:26–27, and 11:21, 24.

84. “Concerning . . . φυσει . . . in Paul, theologians and philosophers are engaged in hot debate,” Käsemann, *Romans*, 63 (full discussion, 62–8). “If Paul makes use of Stoic ideas . . . he does so without surrendering his thought to them,” Dunn, *Romans 1–8*, 99. Romans 2:14–15 is “Paul’s treatment of the *stoa*,” Bayer, *Freedom in Response*, 61. Aquinas’s only reference to these texts when discussing natural law is a dismissal of an invalid exegesis of Romans 2:14 in *ST*, Ia2æ, q. 94. 6.

85. Käsemann, *Romans*, 48.

86. Wright, *Romans*, 441–442.

87. Käsemann, *Romans*, 64.

witness of conscience and the juridical accusation of one's inner thoughts (v. 15b), yet finally determined eschatologically according to Paul's gospel (v. 16), denoting a christological determination of *phusis*, conscience, and inner thoughts. Thus Paul coordinates four morally determining objects: the law's standards written on the heart, conscience, inner accusing thoughts, and the gospel. The first three are subjective, hidden (v. 16b), and determine current moral existence (although inner thoughts also performs an eschatological role, v. 15b–16a), while the gospel is the objective, eschatological, and final arbiter of previous moral judgments. Paul's use of *phusis* is conditioned by christological considerations at all points.

Significantly for the natural law tradition, there is a marked absence of explicit noetic moral psychology in Romans 2:14–16. *Nous* is absent, and although *kardia* does possess an intellectual component, it is not pre-eminent.⁸⁸ Paul's use of *kardia* rather than *nous* suggests that this principal natural law text miscarries if it is understood to refer primarily to human reason.

In Romans 1:26–27 *phusis* and *para phusis* refer to both cognition and affection. Human acts that are *para phusis* manifest dishonorable passions, affirming the traditional opposition between *phusis* and *pathé*. Verse 26 uses *phusis* in an instrumental fashion: the judgment is upon sexual acts that are not in accord with nature. Verse 27 is similarly affective, although desire (*orexis*) replaces dishonorable passions (*epithymia*). The cognitive aspect is found in both positive and negative senses: in verse 25, truth as opposed to falsehood, and in verse 28 a debased mind (*nous*).

Phusis is thus not self-evident or self-explanatory. Actions described as *para phusin* are understood within the context of revelation (Rom 1:18), while the description of God's invisible qualities as plain and clearly understood (v. 19–20) suggests that revelation is coordinate with, not simply supplementary to, natural knowledge, and that the category of self-evidence is more nuanced than proposed. Epistemologically, God's invisible qualities are understood from what is seen, while historically they are known since the creation of the world (v. 20). In contrast to rationalistic theories where self-evidence is central both substantively and cognitively, wisdom is displaced by folly (v. 22), epexegetically glossed as futile thinking (v. 21) and a debased mind (v. 28). The denial of revelation is the causal link (v. 26a) to acts that are *para phusin*. The four divinely determined consequences of such denial are mutual bodily degradation (v. 24), degrading passions (v.

88. *Kardia* "is the concept that pre-eminently denotes the human ego in its thinking, affections, aspirations, decisions, both in man's relation to God and to the world surrounding him," Ridderbos, *Paul*, 119.

26), debased minds, and improper actions (v. 28). Thus the following terms are coordinate: *para phusin*, folly, futile thinking, and a debased mind. All are contra revelation and truth (v. 18), making *para phusis* determined by salvation history.⁸⁹

Romans 11:21 and 24 presents the second use of the *kata phusin/para phusin* form. *Phusis* is determined by divine election and will: Jews are the cultivated olive branches *kata phusin* (v. 21) while Gentiles are the wild olive branches *kata phusin* (v. 24a). The divine ingrafting of these wild olive branches into the cultivated stock is *para phusin*. Both grafting and re-grafting are due to God's power (v. 23). The agricultural metaphor illustrates Paul's elastic use of *phusis*, here possessing neither ethical nor ontological meaning, but referring to salvation history. The same also occurs in Romans 2:27, where Gentiles are uncircumcised by nature.⁹⁰ Nature is determined by its surrounding theological modifiers.

Galatians 2:15 presents *phusis* as birth status determined by salvation history. Ethnic (birth) Jews are "natural Jews," whereas the Gentiles may be "faith Jews," that is, offspring of the person of faith (Gal 3:29). Thus *phusis* contains a distinctly biological and ethnic flavor, although determined by election.

In Galatians 4:8 *phusis* has a realist metaphysical sense: by nature idols are not gods. Despite their external form, such objects possess no divine *phusis*, which suggests that non-congruence between structure (form) and substance (matter) constitutes deception, illustrating the Torrencian realism described earlier. Positivist predications of internal essence to an entity (in this case, divine *phusis* to an act of human *techné*) thus potentially break the inhering unity and self-referentially authenticating and self-evident character of such entities, necessitating their assessment by criteria located in revelation. Such differentiation between *phusis* and its attributions constitute acts of falsehood.

89. Romans 12:1–2 christologically reverses the process of 1:18–32: see Thompson, *Clothed With Christ*. Romans 1:18–32 is the assessment of Gentile morality by the apostle to the Gentiles, whose defense of Gentile inclusion led to the Jerusalem Decree (Acts 15). Bockmuehl, *Jewish Law*, argues that a natural law ethic grounded in the Noachide commands (Genesis 9) lies behind this decree, which appropriated Jewish Halakah for Gentile converts. This suggests that "natural" is still dependent upon revelation and not reason. That an ethic is universal is not identical with it being a natural law ethic.

90. Whether *phusis* means "nature," "convention" or "physically" does not alter the priority of election.

Ephesians 2:3 (“we were by nature, children of wrath”) is universal in scope.⁹¹ Here *phusis* takes a double sense. First, it describes human *post-lapsum* nature (sin and death, v. 1). Second, it has the sense of judicial desert: what is fitting and appropriate, or consequentially right and just due to this sinfulness and its actions (v. 1–3). The appropriate natural consequence in this case is wrath. This is a morally and juridically consequential/deductive use of *phusis*, as in, “This is a cow, so naturally it gives milk,” and could be rendered “thus.”

A use of *phusis* which is “unique in the Pauline corpus”⁹² is found in 1 Corinthians 11:14. The constituents of this paraenesis are creation (v. 7–9, 11–12), angels (v. 10), self-critical awareness (v. 13), apostolic recognition, and catholic practice (v. 16). *Phusis* possesses a morally educative power causing both male shame (v. 14) and female glory (v. 15) in respect to the cultural practice considered. *Phusis* stands with other considerations in determining what is proper (v. 13). Here Paul’s appeal to *phusis* as a basis for Christian practice functions within the broader context of salvation history, and theological, pastoral and ecclesial categories.

As the natural law tradition understands revealed divine law as a *post-lapsum* instantiation of natural law, Paul’s discussion of God’s law in Romans 7:22–23 is apposite, despite the absence of *phusis*. There is a distinction between the inmost self and the external somatic elements (v. 24). It is this “somatic law” which overpowers God’s law, causing captivity to sin. This moral psychology places the mind (*nous*) in the destructive power of members of the body of death, which renders obedience to God’s law problematic or impossible (v. 23–24) unless the whole person (v. 24) is delivered, enabling the mind to serve the law of God (v. 25). In broad Pauline terms, sin morally degrades *phusis* and *nous* into *sarx*,⁹³ which renders natural law’s moral psychology problematic due to reason’s captivity. Despite inwardly delighting in God’s law (Rom 7:22), practical moral inability is experienced (Rom 7:24).

In summary, Paul’s use of *phusis* is non-reducible to the rationalism of the standard natural law tradition. Although he uses it primarily ethically, it can also refer to matters such as election and salvation. As a moral canon it stands within and is interpreted by fundamental theological categories,

91. The change from “you” (v. 1) to “we all” (v. 3).

92. Fee, *Corinthians*, 526–527.

93. The interplay of *sarx* and *soma* is nuanced here, because Christ is *somatic* yet *asarkic* (v.4). *Soma*’s “range of meaning is close to that of *σάρξ*,” Dunn, *Romans* 1–8, 397.

including Christology. By itself it is an inadequate basis for a Christian moral theory.

II. PETER

In 2 Peter 1:4 *phusis* describes eschatological humanity as sharing the divine nature. *Phusis* has a clear ontological meaning, constituting a form of theandric *ousia*. The Palamite tradition interprets this participation to be in the energies, not the essence, of God, coordinating divine nature (v. 4) with divine power (v. 3), thus avoiding pan(en)theism. This participation approximates the “in Christ” formula of John and Paul. Participation in future glory (1 Pet 5:1; see also 2 Pet 1:3b), and being made like Christ (1 John 3:2) both share the eschatologically and ontologically transformative sense of 2 Peter 1:4.

This transformation is moral as well as ontological, for participating in God’s nature involves escaping worldly corruptions caused by lust (v. 4). This moral dimension of *phusis* is evident in the virtue paraenesis immediately following (v. 5–10), and in a rare New Testament use of virtue, *arête* (v. 3). The teleological/eschatological sense means that human transformation will reach beyond current renewal, and is promissory (v. 4, 11). This constitutes a virtue-teleological natural law ethic, or an acts/end theory, as the end (*theosis*, v. 4) not only comes about through the moral practices and dispositions listed (v. 5–10), but also determines those acts and dispositions. The ascended Christ is the obvious candidate for the theandric model, as the reference to Christ’s glory and excellence suggests (v. 3). Thus the precise character of the eschatological *phusis* of believers is determined by the interpretation of “participation” as a coordinate of the *phusis* of the glorified Christ, rather than phenomenologically or by metaphysical speculation.

Consequently, a Christian theory of human nature necessitates an architectonic role for Christ as proper, and thus perfect, human nature.⁹⁴ The eternal Son’s election and historical incarnation provides the ontological/protological aspect, his ascension and glorification the teleological aspect, with redeemed humanity’s teleological glorified transformation parasitic thereon. By omitting Christology and eschatology, traditional natural law ignores two central elements in Christian theorizing about human *phusis* and restricts itself to speculative rational metaphysics (e.g., participation in eternal reason), or empirical observation (e.g., protological/ontological theories of rationality or teleological theories of self-evident natural inclinations).⁹⁵

94. Chalcedonian Christology constitutes Part Three.

95. Derived from *φάω* (to grow), *φύσις* takes on a vitalistic and biological tone in

This constitutes a basic lack. In this respect, Augustine's eternal/natural law ethic, despite its lack of explicit Christology, is more adequate due to its strong teleological (eschatological) eudemonistic *agapaism*,⁹⁶ which reflects Petrine use.

Both the mundane and eschatological aspects of human nature are coordinated by the double use of *arête*. First, *arête* is coordinate with Christ's ascended glory (v. 3), confirming the moral aspect of eschatological theandric nature. The second use (v. 5) links present existence (v. 5–10) with eschatological transformation (v. 10–11, see also v. 4 and v. 11). Such future hope (the end) determines that present life is shaped through virtue (the means, v. 3, 5–7). Hence the final end/good of participation in the divine nature (v. 4) *necessitates* (τοῦ, v. 5a) the means/virtue practice. This means that the instrumental character of *arête*'s practices or acts (love, goodness, kindness, etc.) lies in *arête* belonging to humanity's essential being. The practices internal to our nature serve to realize the *telos* of that nature because our *end* is a function of our *kind*. This *end* of the perfective process of our *kind* is participation in Christ's *arête* because his human nature is perfect. By binding temporal human existence to the eschatological Christ, *arête* makes humanity's intrinsic moral nature christological in character.

In 2 Peter 2:12, to act immorally is to act like irrational animals. Animal *phusis* as irrational and ignorant implies the rational nature of human *phusis*. The vice list (v. 10–15) is an ethically rich exegesis of irrational and ignorant speech (v. 12), suggesting that the opposing virtues constitute rational action. Human *phusis* is thus clearly implied as rational in contrast with non-human non-rational sentient life. *Phusis* here is a species-specific term and provides the basis for criticizing irrational human behavior as ethically cross-species and thus *para phusis*. This species-specific use of *phusis* as "kind" is also found in James 3:7.

Paul and Peter's use of *phusis* does not support a natural law ethic either as wholly rational or as possessing any status extraneous to theological categories. Biblical *phusis* thus provides the basis for a naturalistic ethic that is theologically derivative and provisional. The four Greek psychological terms that primarily bear upon *phusis* are *kardia*, *synerdēsis*, *nous*, and *logos*, the latter two providing nature's cognitive and rational aspect. The will weakens all their divinely created but currently flawed powers.

Aristotle. Torrance, *Divine Meaning*, 211.

96. When discussing eternal law, Augustine's dualistic anthropology of ascending value terminates in God: humans are body and soul, the soul is constituted of both animal faculties and reason, and reason is action and (final) contemplation of God "when we shall be like him, for we shall see Him as he is," "Reply to Faustus," XXII. 27, 283.

Thus natural law understood as a wholly rationalistic ethic⁹⁷ displays an unacceptably narrow New Testament moral psychology. Theologically rich lexical contexts interpret *phusis* as a provisional and secondary category contingent upon election, divine power, soteriology, eschatology, Christology, and the gospel. Nowhere is human *phusis* equated exclusively with *logos*, *nous*, or *phronēsis*. The ethically rich lexical contexts (the virtue/vice lists) suggest human *phusis* is inherently ethical and necessitates virtue practice and vice avoidance for its realization. Hence unrighteousness generates irrationality that degrades human nature toward animal nature (2 Pet 2:9–22). As *phusis* must necessarily be invested with external critical content due to its polysemous sense,⁹⁸ theological categories are necessary to constitute a natural law theory as Christian. Thus Finnis’s statement that “natural law can be understood, assented to, applied, and reflexively analyzed without adverting to the existence of God”⁹⁹ is contested. The *kata phusin/para phusin* formula suggests that the virtue lists describe moral reasoning, dispositions, and acts that are properly natural, while the vice lists describe human reason, acts, and dispositions that are improper to human nature. However, because of the human tendency to moral irrationality, infallible claims to knowledge that is *kata phusin* are tempered. Consequently, because *phusis* is coordinated with revelation, Chalcedonian Christology enables a reframing of natural law ethics based upon true human nature, which is pursued later.

4. Conclusion

Chapter 1 has proposed a theory of nature grounded in a three-leveled critical realism (objective reality, epistemology, and semantics), which maintains the naturalistic axiom. It has been argued that the polysemous sense of “nature” necessitates its supplementation by theological terms, and that such an approach is consonant with the New Testament’s use of *phusis*. This

97. “A rational ethic is based upon rational considerations and is logically consistent . . . A rationalistic ethic, on the other hand, allows only the reason to determine moral theology, at the expense of other human spiritual capabilities and ethical phenomena,” Göran Bexell, “Is Grisez’s Moral Theology Rationalistic? Free Choice, the Human Condition, and Christian Ethics,” in Biggar and Black, *Revival of Natural Law*, 133.

98. “In ‘naturalness,’ there is always secreted that which is non-natural,” Barth, *Romans*, 52, commenting on Rom. 1:25–27.

99. Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights*, 49. That the “standard natural law theory is not essentially theistic shows it is inadequate as a theistic explanation of natural law,” Murphy, *God and Moral Law*, 70.

is developed in Part Three. The rationalism of traditional natural law is foreign to the New Testament.

The origin of formal natural law in antiquity reveals a twofold taxonomy: the teleological in Aristotle, and the protological in Cicero. Despite not being exclusive, they provide a useful division for assessing natural law, which is now considered.